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ABSTRACT 
This article explicates how 21st Century changes in the form of globalization are of 
historical scale, how they play out in terms of risks and inequalities shaping human 
experience, and how they have changed social welfare and public policy making 
worldwide. After presenting facts of inequality and such consequences as planetary 
poverty and gender stratification, it highlights the reformulation of economic power 
associated with burgeoning free-market economies and accompanying diffusion of 
instrumental rationality, standardization and commodification. In contrast with the 
recent US economic downturn and global softening of labor markets which cry for 
greater social protection, the welfare state of the last century has been replaced by a 
competitive state of the 21st century, as a “non-sovereign power” mindful of its global 
positioning but less powerful in shaping daily life among social forces including the 
role of NGOs. Indicating a lag between transnational developments and the way 
analysts think of social policies, the paper asserts that nation-states nonetheless serve 
important administrative functions in a world dominated by transnational corporate 
interests. In considering all the challenges to justice and governance, the authors argue 
that social welfare needs to be redefined and extended while market economy must be 
guided by moral principles that embody fundamental human values. 
 
Keywords: Globalization and Post-Industrialism; Market Economy and Inequality; 
Social Welfare and Public Policy 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As we move into what can be called the “global century”, many aspects of 
social and economic life are changing and post-industrial shifts are unparalleled by 
virtue of the interconnectedness that brings together the far corners of the globe.  New 
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technologies, new economic relationships, new social processes, and new political 
developments are all characteristics of globalization (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 22) in 
a post-industrial age featured by information, innovation, finance, and services. As the 
world has contracted, people’s quality of life has changed regardless of where they 
live. In fact, the propagation of free market mindsets in emerging economies has 
created collective network connections with considerable good but pervasive 
inequalities as well.   
A principal aim of this paper is to explicate how these changes are of historical 
scale, how they are part of what post-industrial welfare is all about, and how they play 
out in terms of risks and inequalities shaping human experience. There is a tension 
with this. On the one hand, life expectancy, health statuses and per capital incomes 
are at an all-time high and many feudal practices have been relegated to the past 
(Phillipson, 2006).  On the other hand, vast numbers of people struggle with poverty 
and significant pockets of poverty portend more than lack of income.  Those living on 
the bottom of the socio-economic ladder labor under the burden of avoidable, lifestyle 
diseases, hunger and related maladies, not to mention myriad social risks (Turner, 
2008).  Those on the upper reaches of the same ladder garner disproportionate shares 
of the resources and are able to support comfortable lifestyles (Esping-Anderson, 
1990).   
 
Around the globe there are bona fide challenges facing nation-states as they 
attempt to adapt to the impact of modifications in morbidity, mortality, and need 
gradients among diverse segments of their populations.  In the face of rapid 
demographic transformations resulting in fewer casualties from acute diseases, aging 
of populations, and tumultuous economies, there are widening disparities between the 
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“haves” and the “have nots” and considerable quality-of-life inequalities within and 
between populations. In developing countries, China being one of the most striking 
cases in point but with parallels in a number of other developing countries the 
differential in per capital incomes of urban and rural people is at least a factor of three 
with virtually no top quartile wage earners residing in rural areas (Powell and Cook, 
2010).  Not surprisingly, there is a tangible rural to urban migration for economic 
gain, thereby creating even greater disparities as those left behind barely eke out 
subsistence livings.   
It is impossible to overstate the risks of planetary poverty. More than 2.5 
billion of the planet’s population live on less than US$2 a day and nearly a billion still 
have less than US$1 daily (Chen & Ravallion, 2007). As might be apparent, in this 
day and age poverty creates conditions in which rationality is redefined, nation-states 
struggle to control circumstances, not to mention criminality, low birth weights are 
ubiquitous, ill-health a fact of life, illiteracy rampant, malnutrition commonplace, 
environmental degradation seen as the cost of doing business, and notions of social 
justice are brought face-to-face with priorities said to have greater standing (Beck, 
1999).   Focusing on the extent of the disparities for just a moment: not only is there 
asymmetry but real immiseration as well -- only about five percent of the world’s 
income is earned by the poorest 40% of its people (Estes, Biggs and Phillipson, 2003).  
 
The chasm between rich and poor is becoming even steeper.  According to the 
12th Annual World Wealth Report (2008), the wealth of people around the world with 
more than US$1 million in assets grew faster in 2007 than the world’s economy.  The 
world’s economy exhibited a 5% gain in 2007; compared with a growth rate of over 
9% among those with at least US$1 million in assets.  Furthermore, the average 
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wealth of these high net worth individuals (HNWIs) climbed to over US$ 4 million, 
exclusive of their residence. Interestingly, the greatest growth among HNWIs 
occurred in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia led by Brazil, Russia, India and 
China.  When the “mass affluent” population (those with less than US$ 1 million but 
with substantial assets nonetheless) is added to the picture, the result is that the richest 
20 percent of the world’s population controls more than 75% of its wealth.  In the past 
few decades there has been some astonishing gains among a relatively small 
percentage of the world’s population (approximately 10 million out of 6.7 billion 
people can be classified as HNWIs) who are tapped into robust gains and wealth 
generation strategies (Annual World Wealth Report, 2008). As should be apparent, 
the ascendancy of those forces concentrating high net worth wealth and capital 
accumulation among a narrow upper-crust is also capable of producing abject poverty 
among other segments of the population (Arias and Logan, 2002:197; Jessop, 2002). 
While the richest 1 percent of wealthy outliers are benefiting from speculation and the 
deregulation of commerce and free trade, those on the other end of the economic 
ladder are gaining little, if at all as the wealth gap widens. 
  
Some estimates conservatively place the gap between the richest and poorest 
nations at an all time high of more than 50 to 1 (Clark, 2007).  Even with the stalling 
of mature economies, the gulf between the most advantaged and the most 
disadvantaged in developed countries is no less dramatic; factor in the impact of 
gender, ethnicity or other social impediments and the complexity intensifies as 
formidable inequalities shape well-being (Powell and Cook, 2010). The disparities 
play out in a number of ways, extending well beyond vital income differentials to 
quality of life issues, education, structured dependencies or social exclusions resulting 
5 
 
from policy decisions (Townsend, 2007).  Navarro (2007) and others add their voice 
to Townsend’s assertion by noting that escalating differentials can be attributed in no 
small part to interventionist strategies adopted and endorsed by national governments.   
Not surprisingly, as a consequence of the richest segments of the population having 
far greater assets and control over their lives, they feel they have more in common 
with their counterparts in other regions than they do with their less affluent opposite 
number in their own regions (Hoogvelt, 1997).  These trends are becoming 
increasingly vivid and no government is evading the prospect of having to reshuffle 
what they provide their citizens. Cross-cultural comparisons are extraordinarily 
valuable in helping lay out causal connections and for double-checking inferences.  
For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has a reliable cross-national  comparative database of indicators of social policy 
expenditures in 30 member nations and their state sponsored social welfare provisions 
entitled Social Expenditures (SocX) in the period 1980-2003. It covers public 
expenditures for typical forms of welfare including old age, survivors, incapacity-
related benefits, health, family, active labor market programs, unemployment, 
housing, and other social policy areas (education excepted).  Shalev (2007) points out 
that if health and pension benefits are combined as a share of GDP countries like 
Sweden rank at the top by devoting some 14% of its GDP to health and pension 
protections.  Data for the period 1980-2001, the latest available on the OCED web-
site, suggests that Germany expends about 8% and the United States and Japan about 
4%.  Overall, however, the English speaking countries are among the most 
conservative spenders for health and old-age provisions, while Japan is a high spender 
when all provisions are considered.     
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GLOBALIZATION AND REFORMULATION OF ECONOMIC POWER 
 
The proliferation of adjuvant ideologies evolving out of burgeoning free-
market economies along with an accompanying diffusion of instrumental rationality, 
standardization, commoditization, or secularism have become embedded in our 
thinking, challenging all other relational metrics of daily life.  In the process, modes 
of interaction and standards of assessing relational status or personal worth are recast. 
In both developed and emerging economies the nature of work and the meaning of 
careers are also undergoing major reformulations.  There is a global softening of labor 
markets linked to downsizing of local employment opportunities, redundancies, a 
spate of subcontracting arrangements, and an economic volatility abetted by 
technological innovations that chip away at employment security, wage or benefit 
packages bringing a degree of economic and existential uncertainty to greater 
numbers of people. Of course such changes are not distributed evenly across all forms 
of employment, further exacerbating inequalities.   
 
It should also be stressed that adversity does not appear to strike women and 
men equally − and it is certainly reasonable to say that disadvantage begets 
disadvantage when downturns occur. Women are disproportionately among the most 
disadvantaged and with age even greater hardships accrue to them. Adding to the 
intricacies of these unparalleled changes is the velocity with which they are taking 
place and the fact that they are accompanied by a deepening division between those 
whose principal pursuits are in subsistence or service sector markets and their 
counterparts who are primarily involved in large-scale export, international sectors, or 
equity markets. Together these forces are bringing about a profound imbalance within 
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and between populations as one group shares in the generation of wealth while the 
other becomes increasingly dependent and is being subordinated to decisions made in 
the other sector, by a cartel half a world away (Bauman, 1998).    
 
 Without suggesting or trying to make it sound as though national governments 
or their policies are anything less than all-encompassing in their reach, it is also the 
case that national governments no longer set their own course independently of 
economic currents sweeping around the globe, felt in every country and affecting 
virtually every policy a government might implement. This is not to say that states are 
mere minions of transnational interests but it is no longer the case that nation-state 
sovereignty can be taken-for-granted in the policy realm.  Nor is it necessarily the 
case that state policies are as all-powerful as they once were in shaping daily life 
(Dallmayer, 2005; Fraser, 2005).  As Evans and Cerny (2004) so cogently assert, the 
welfare state of the last century has been replaced by a competitive state of the 21st 
century, always mindful of its global positioning (see also, Hudson & Lowe, 2004). 
Foucault (1978) coined the phrase “non-sovereign power” when he was discussing 
issues of bodily control.  By drawing a nice analogy Yapa (2002:15) proposes that a 
parallel concept may provide insights into the vagaries of post-industrial public-sector 
decision making. To make sense of domestic versus international priorities and their 
effect on daily life, scholars would do well to come to terms with the notion of “non-
sovereign power” as it applies to social justice, autonomy, monetary policies and 
capital mobility, and other forms of extra-national pressures emending local policies. 
We would assert that to date there has been a real lag between transnational 
developments and the way analysts think of social policies.  Appadurai (2001) 
attributes the stumbling blocks in conceptualization to “…the disjunctures between 
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various vectors characterizing this world-in-motion that produce fundamental 
problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice, and governance” (Appadurai, 2001: 
6). In his characterization, proximate social issues have causes that are hardly local 
and call for non-parochial perspectives if they are to be addressed.  
 
As Giddens maintains, one of the most significant impacts of globalization is 
that it has brought an “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990:64). As a consequence, few governments 
are eager to make decisions separately from their reliance on global enterprise; it is as 
though they are in a situation of shared sovereignty, having to negotiate between 
domestic, international, corporatist, and transnational interests (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Hill, 2006; Kennett, 2001; Navarro, 2007).  NGOs such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund have also become architectural partners in local 
policy deliberations by sanctioning preferred welfare policies as a condition of their 
support of monetization (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 1997; Dembele, 2007; Hart, 
2002).  Even so, nation-states nonetheless serve important administrative functions in 
a world dominated by transnational corporate interests and it is unlikely that 
governmental responsibilities are either going to be usurped or allowed to wither in 
light of their functionality (Hill, 2006; Navarro, 2007).  It is not too far fetched to say 
that certain transnational interests see themselves as having universal jurisdiction, 
assertions of state autonomy notwithstanding.  
 
With the spreading of these transformations has come a reshuffling of local 
priorities, with governmental emoluments directed or redirected to areas defined as 
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having the greatest public importance and bringing the greatest returns. Of course the 
realities behind that assertion are deserving of close scrutiny as the policy process is 
unquestionably political and the state must mediate rival claims as it serves as the 
principal mechanism by which revenues are collected and resources distributed.  
Meanwhile, social entitlements, expenditures, and daily experience for people who 
may not fully grasp the raison d'être behind their situations reflect these same 
priorities.   Hill (2006) suggests that social policy regimes are regularly structured to 
be consistent with other forms of social stratification within a country.  To the extent 
there is a convergence in social welfare policies around the globe it might not be mere 
coincidence that social stratification and social class divisions are growing more 
pronounced in the face of globalization.  In light of global economic flows, the 
salience and permeability of national borders, whether in Europe, the western 
hemisphere, or in the East are a different matter than they were even half a century 
ago (Kearney, 1995).    
In terms of both economics and domestic social policies, the impact of 
international economic relations has recontoured the landscape, so to speak, all the 
way to the regionalization and appropriation of economic relations.  What were once 
bold lines of demarcation are now dotted lines more suggestive of administrative 
spheres than jingoistic borders. In the global century, deregulated markets are tightly 
integrated with political and social transformations, affecting local circumstances and 
communality (Geetz, 1973).    All in all, the globalizing influences of the early 21st 
century are producing a distinctive era in social history linked to the emergence of 
transnational actors as well as economics and technologies that are helping fuel the 
shifts. Global economic change portends more than alterations in per capita income, 
the nature of financial products and currency markets, or the rapid circulation of 
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goods, communication or technologies. It is precursor to broad cultural and political 
shifts that challenge pre-contact arrangements, notions of social justice and solidarity, 
as well as local interaction patterns. In a post-modern world, globalization is creating 
interlocking dependencies linked to the ways in which priorities are ordained by 
transnational interests.  As Chen and Turner (2006) point out in a discussion focused 
on the welfare of the elderly but equally applicable to all social welfare, the accrual of 
public benefits reflects the invisible hand of market forces, the invisible handshake of 
tradition, and the invisible foot of political decisions. Despite avowals about the 
secularity of modern life, economic-thinking, what might be termed spreadsheet logic, 
is accorded near theological status, its canons seen as universally applicable and 
providing appropriate precept for adjudicating what is considered fair and just. These 
tendencies are abetted by what is sometimes called the cyber infrastructure, or more 
simply, informatics, reinforcing these shifts and creating a digital divide separating 
those on either edge of the diffusion of innovations.  Of course there is more to this 
technological transformation than the appearance of new ways to communicate, it has 
also paved the way to a post-fordist formulation that Castells (2000) labels network 
capitalism. 
 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
 We do not mean to imply that globalization comes as a unified package; it is 
nonetheless true that major changes have resulted from an ability to move capital 
around as summarily as desired to gain leverage, possibly destabilizing local financial 
and labor-markets in the process.  Real questions have emerged about the autonomy 
of nation-states and the balancing of altruistic social expenditures with economic 
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participation on the world stage.  The tensions between social protections and global 
corporate connections are contributing to what can aptly be called “social deficits” in 
which people are left to fend for themselves to the extent that they are able.  In the 
face of inflation and related economic adversities, slashing social spending is 
routinely offered as a fitting resolution preferable to raising taxes for wealthy 
individuals or corporations (Mishra, 1999). The global span of information 
technologies and the advent of the global compass held by transnational corporations 
means they are able to shift extraction, manufacturing, fabrication and many service 
functions to whatever locale offers the most favorable economic returns, including tax 
structures.  These and other consequences of globalization are fraught with new risks 
and ambiguities in daily experience and in the way matters of worth are defined; 
along with the many positive aspects that are undeniably part of the process 
associated with privatization.   
 
 In a synopsis of a few of the more evident effects of globalization, Navarro 
(2007) points to the privatization of services, public assets, and other public 
provisions in asymmetrical fashion; deregulation of labor and currency markets as 
well as other forms of commerce; free trade; escalation of an accompanying anti-
interventionist rhetoric; encouragement of individualism and consumerism.  A 
number of commentators have noted that a corollary of globalization results in an 
unprecedented pattern of social risk.  As Townsend (2007) so elegantly points out, the 
globalization of the marketplace is changing the face of dependency. It is as though 
the configuration of risks has shifted from settling on just those poor, down and outers 
living along society’s margins to those derailed by restructuring of labor markets, the 
dramatic spread of employment in service sector jobs, shifts in the types of career 
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patterns that so characterized the 20th century, and the role of informatics affecting 
employability of middle-class workers.   
 
These risks are not grounded merely in the absence of resources but in an 
absence of personal autonomy and by people’s position relative to others. Add to 
these factors the fact that as they wrestle with the issues, national and local 
governments are assailed from multiple fronts; pressed by transnational interests to 
provide open trade liberalization for private enterprise; and pressed by the growing 
need for social protections and labor policies to sustain the working populace and 
those whose lives have fallen through the proverbial social safety net.  Ever more 
inclusive protections call for targeted expenditures at exactly the time when 
expenditures are hemmed-in by capacity to levy taxes of any type but especially 
progressive taxes and by powerful interested constituencies. The neoliberal 
globalizing drive has disenfranchised workers and their representatives in ways that 
have eroded their ability to bargain for benefits.  Many commentators have noted that 
governments have generally adopted a laissez faire stance when for one reason or 
another they have chosen not to intervene in the disempowerment of the citizenry 
(Navarro, 2007).   
 
As a facet of a much broader movement toward privatization, governmental 
social services are adopting a market-based management model and relying on non-
governmental agencies (NGOs) to take up the slack.  There is a wide array of 
subtypes and expenditure patterns associated with every form but an underlying logic 
in nearly all instances is a push toward commodification or cost-effectiveness of the 
programs (couched in terms of return on investment measured by market-driven 
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stipulations), in contrast to their ability to genuinely affect lives.  Policy recipients not 
likely to provide economic returns on governmental investments in them tend to be 
defined as burdensome charity cases.  There are extensive changes that may be 
adapted to local contextual factors reflecting long-standing norms, values, religions, 
policies, existing social metrics, and institutionalized arrangements even as they 
embody overtones imposed by international priorities (Dallmayer, 2005; Fraser, 
2005).  Unraveling the relative importance of domestic arrangements and 
transnational influences can be a tricky task, to say the least.  It involves both an in-
depth grasp of domestic issues and an international perspective, an awareness of 
transnational forces impinging on local decisions, and sophisticated methodological 
and theoretical frameworks. 
 
The commodification of social services, as it is sometimes called, is abetted by 
a transfer of issues of citizenship to a forum which is no longer native in its scope but 
transnational; marked by intergovernmental structures, multinational corporate 
influence, and population changes (Ascoli and Ranci, 2002; Phillipson, 2006:202).   
There is another layer of complexity added by a worldwide tendency to view a 
number of social issues through a medical lens (e.g., Kutchins & Kirk, 2003) and the 
insecurities experienced by the citizenry in general are without parallel in world 
history. What might be described as apodictic, self-evident truths of tradition tend to 
lose their currency and help demarcate generational and participatory categories from 
one another.    
 In the face of an unswerving drive to be players on the world’s stage, enhance 
market share and survive economic rip-tides, nation-states must balance the demands 
of competing claimants—leaving them few options but to make hard choices.  Not 
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only do they have to adjudicate where to put scarce resources and which groups are 
deserving of protection or support, but few actions are indemnified against the next 
economic shortfall meaning they will have to review their priorities anew each time 
the economic tides turn.  It has always been true that in times of plenty promises 
about solutions to societal woes are an easy pledge to make; during times of scarcity it 
is a different story and keeping even the best intentioned promises oftentimes creates 
real conflicts. Societal-level redefinitions of what is fair and just are a common means 
to solutions that do not always do well by citizens in need of assistance, undermining 
personal sense of security and identity as well as social solidarity (Powell, 2010).  
 An illustration of a macro-level problem may be helpful for thinking about the 
type of quandary involved.  As nation-states undergo economic development via 
participation in global commerce, per capita incomes generally increase, never mind 
for the moment internal disparities, life expectancies increase, and demands for 
healthcare mount. Continued change and desires to remain viable in the global 
economy mean a country will face enduring challenges in providing social safety nets, 
medical interventions, or financing health care protections. To focus on just the health 
care issue: despite subsidized provisions for indigent citizens, most healthcare 
coverage around the world is linked to employment and economic productivity 
(workfare) and as employment is destabilized so, too, is healthcare.  Needless to say, 
employment-based systems are costly, leading to cost shifting which also serves to 
grant license to employers to cut jobs and move production around to minimize the 
expense of doing business (ironically, economic reform in former socialist countries 
took the same direction, e.g., Chen, 2004).  For those not covered by employment-
based plans, subsidized coverage is oftentimes available but financed by taxes and 
premiums or by governmentally mandated insurance groups saddled with high 
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expectations and expenditures. But social policies supportive of indigent care for 
those not involved in economically productive activities are often singled out as a cost 
sink and are among the first issues put on cost-cutting agenda (Jessop, 2002).    
 
In order to comprehend the underpinning of certain forms of inequalities it is 
also important to examine some of the transformations that are altering people’s lives. 
One post-modernist reality of the 21st century is the existence of a digital divide 
between those who have always known how to navigate in key-stroke technologies 
and those “ancients” who learned it later or not at all.  Those who are comfortable 
with the technology have the world at their finger tips and no longer depend on local 
relationships or role models for solace or validation.  The result is an indisputable 
social segmentation.  Whatever norms of reciprocity had existed before are likely to 
falter and fray under the impact of interdicting worldviews in which the deep 
grammar of socialibility is no longer meaningful to those versed in the newer modes 
of activity. At the same time, there is an erosion of communities of like minds with 
shared representations cutting across society at large and fostering social solidarity.  
Instead they are replaced by segmented, smaller communities and a blurring of ways 
of knowing the world. Beck, Bonass and Lau (2003: 6) characterize the effects of 
technological innovation as “revolution through side effects” and suggest a deep-
seeded societal segmentation is a likely upshot and should not be surprising.  
Addressing comparable consequences, Dasgupta (2006:159) phrased it succinctly: 
“globalization has thus created an identity crisis, since many are neither local nor 
global and are overloaded with changing stimuli…resulting in a ‘don’t care’ attitude, 
commercial interactions among family members, a rise of individualism and a 
disequilibrium….”  
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 Transnational private enterprises cannot be ignored as they are altering the 
landscape but they are not doing so single-handedly.  It is fair to say there are both 
private and semi-public but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved.  
Multilateral NGOs are playing an especially crucial role and certainly a role that is 
influencing developing countries as they sort out their welfare regimes.  For example, 
since the issuance of the Berg Report in 1981, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have become major players on the world’s stage oftentimes 
stipulating structural adjustments and preferred policies nation-states should adopt as 
a condition of support and in order to attract direct capital investments or other fiscal 
cooperation, including monetization. One illustration is that the World Bank began 
urging diminutions in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension provisions in favor of means-
tested pensions and private provisions in the mid-1990s.  The World Bank and the 
IMF have been staunch advocates for over three decades for broadly defined market-
led welfare policies as a preferred alternative to un- or under-funded public welfare 
(Dembele, 2007; Wade, 2007).  Encapsulating both the criticisms and the confluence 
of forces fueling such a movement, McMichael (2000) asserts that the drive for 
economic integration pays precious little attention to nation-building, national 
interests, or public sector regulatory control.  As a consequence, even nonprofit, social 
enterprises tend to be “doing good badly” (Tekula, 2010).   
 
COROLLARIES OF PUBLIC POLICY: MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN 
GLOBAL ARENA 
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 Although there is a remarkable absence of consensus, social welfare is 
customarily taken to mean statutory governmental intervention designed to provide 
supportive services and resources to those in need.  Right away one question that has 
to be addressed revolves around eligibility requirements and stipulations of 
entitlement.  Such issues as gender are very much a part of the state, as are 
discussions of family responsibilities, and welfare policies. At the risk of extreme 
simplification, whether women are eligible for social benefits and services in their 
own rights or as members of a male-breadwinner family is an abiding question 
whenever welfare regimes are examined. By the same token, gender ideologies are 
very much an aspect of poverty, labor markets and other market experiences, or the 
myriad inequalities that cut across the life course and through virtually every facet of 
experience (Calasanti, 2001; Hatch, 2000; Sainsbury, 1994; 1996). 
 
These same forces also affect lives in even more subtle ways beyond the realm 
of income, access or protection.  Just one case in point out of scores of similar 
situations should suffice to illustrate our contention. It is fair to say that institutional 
arrangements and structural realignments have altered time and temporality as they 
have altered space and other normative aspects of life.  Containing our focus to the 
issues discussed thus far; the ebb and flow of transnational capital markets operate 
around the clock and penetrates virtually every aspect of governmental policy and, 
accordingly, daily life. Analysts generally concur that there has been a compression of 
time in many corners of the world as they are pulled into global market flows (Powell, 
2010).  As should be fairly obvious, any attenuation of earlier subjective temporal 
reckoning requires a recalibration and re-integration as new templates are 
incorporated into mental models of what life is about.  Analysts have asserted that 
18 
 
globalization brings a dilation, fragmentation and acceleration of the sense of time 
unsettling to many (Lestienne, 2000). But, as with so many other aspects of 
globalization, the results do not settle on all people in equal fashion.  For those who 
live along the margins of such change, feelings of being in-control and the clarity of 
their proleptic futures may be challenged as the pace, and types of engagements in 
their lives are restructured.  Considered in a broader sense, temporal reorganization is 
also impacting event timing and thereby the shape of life, views of dependency, and 
definitions of personal worth.  As normative perspectives on the shape of life are 
reformulated and/or personal functionality wanes, the chances increase that some 
subgroups within the population will lose track of their referential guidelines (Moody 
2006). 
 In her insightful analysis of German pension provisions, Scheiwe (1994) 
brings a fresh perspective to discussion of how institutionalized welfare rules also 
structure temporality.  She broadens the focus considerably in her examination of time 
politics and gendered times in legislation that grants standing to many market-related 
definitions of time and discounts others associated most frequently with women’s 
roles outside the market or which result from discontinuous market-related activities 
deemed to be below time thresholds written into public welfare provisions.  The 
gendered differentials in recognizing life’s events, their timing and related 
circumstances serve to create essential inequalities in financial and other types of 
well-being. Time and temporality, sense of the future, and eligibility for entitlements 
impose structure on lives in ways that may not have been intended but are highly 
salient, nonetheless.  
 
 
19 
 
For the most part, a definition derived from the legendary Beveridge Report 
published in the midst of World War II in Britain has been utilized to identify and 
operationalize major features of the welfare state (Finer, 1999).  Yet that formulation 
begs the question of whether that world and those circumstances still exist and how 
they may have been modified by post-industrial or globalizing influences. We would 
assert that a definition of social welfare must extend beyond questions of delivery to 
include its financing and function. Almost certainly the provision of non-
governmental services through NGOs or volunteer agencies and programs should be 
included as well. Ambiguities not withstanding, it is hardly surprising that scholars 
looking at social welfare in a comparative focus have noted that there is a fairly direct 
correlation between national prosperity and percentage of GDP directed at supportive 
programs (Hill, 2006).  However, within groups of nations (such as OECD, G-8, or G-
20 countries) there are differences based on governmental types or economic 
developments and, we assert, in terms of underlying principles of moral economy that 
have shaped the formulation of welfare, whether that be public or private.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We have endeavored to illuminate the challenges to international social 
welfare in the broad context of global and post-industrial economy and public policy. 
We hope that it will provide researchers with a deeper understanding of the key issues 
of inequality and social justice with critical thinking about post-welfare state social 
policies. 
Inequality is an outstanding issue in the study of post-industrialism while 
globalization has widened its consequences such as planetary poverty and gender 
stratification. The potential reasons lie in the reformulation of economic power 
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associated with burgeoning free-market economies and accompanying diffusion of 
instrumental rationality, standardization, commoditization, or secularism. In contrast 
with the economic downturn and global softening of labor markets which cry for 
greater social protection, the welfare state of the last century has been replaced by a 
competitive state of the 21st century, as a “non-sovereign power” mindful of its global 
positioning but less powerful in shaping daily life among social forces including the 
role of NGOs. However, nation-states still serve important administrative functions in 
a world dominated by transnational corporate interests. In the face of all these 
challenges to justice and governance, there must be a twin track approach: social 
welfare needs to be redefined and extended while market economy must be guided by 
moral principles that embody fundamental human values. 
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